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[So F. No. 21028. In Bank. Oct. 4,1962.) 
LEON H. MAYHOOD, Plaintiff and Respondent, V. 
NANETTE R. MITCHELL LA ROSA et aI., Defend-
ants and Appellants. 
[la,lb] Husband and Wife-Oommunity and Separate Property-
Prodts of Business.-Where the husband acquired certain real 
property before his marriage and such land was used during 
the 44 years of the marriage to grow fruit trees and grape 
vines, the husband devoting most of his working time Rnd 
energy to managing and cultivating the orchard and vineyard 
and all reeeipts therefrom being placed in a single bank 
aceount· and all expenditures being made from such account, 
the funds from that bank account that were used to pay for 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Community Property, §§ 21, 22 j Am.Jur., 
Community Property (1st ed § 32). 
Melt. Dig. References: [1, 2] Husband and Wife, § 58; [3, 4) 
Depositions, §?:T. 
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improvements to the laud must be apportioned between the 
husband's separate property and the community property and 
any increase in the value of the land attributable to the hus-
band's efforts must be. allocated to community property to 
determine what interest the deceased wife's sole devisee has 
in the llmd. 
[2] ld.-Community and Separate Property-Profits of Business. 
-The part of the profits of a separate property enterprise 
attributable to the husband's efforts is cOillluunity property, 
whether the, ellterpri;;e be classified as "colllmercial" or 
"agricul tural." 
[3] Depositions-Use in Evidence-Admissibility.-Under Code 
Civ. Proc., § 2030, subd. (b), providing that answers to inter-
rogatories lllay be used to the sallle extent as provided in 
Code Civ. Proc., § 2016, subd. (d), which provides for the use 
of a p:lrty's depo~ition, by an adverse party for any purpose, 
it was error to rule that defendants could not introduce into 
evidence plaintiff's deposition and certain answers he gave to 
interrogatories except to impeach his testimony; such deposi-
tion and answers to interrogatories, insofar as they contained 
admissions, should have been admitted in evidence. 
[4] ld.-Use in Evidence-Admissibility.-Since an adverse party's 
deposition lllay be used to establish any material fact, a prima 
facie case" or even to prove the whole case, a party is not 
limited to using an adverse party's deposition or answers to 
interrogatories for the purpose of impeaching his testimony. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Solano County. Harlow V. Greenwood, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to quiet title to real property. Judgment for plain-
tiff reversed. 
John J. Taheny for Defendants and Appellants. 
Dobbins & Weir, Goodman & Goodman and Walter W. Weir 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title 
to 47 acres of land against Nanette La Rosa, the granddaugh-
ter and sole devisee of Hattie Mayhood, and against the 
personal l'l'presentative of Mrs. Mayhood's estate. Plaintiff 
acquired the land before his marriage to Mrs. M:ayhood in 
1915. Mrs. Mayhood died in 1959. During the 44 years of 
the marriage, the land was used to grow fruit trees and grape 
vines. Until he became incapacitated by illness in 1957, plain-
) 
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tiff devoted most of his working time and cnergy to managing 
and cultivating the orchard and vineyard. All receipts there-
from were placed in a single bank account, and all expendi-
tures were made from this account. Oue such expenditure, in 
the amount of $12,000, was for a residence constructed on the 
land in 1928. Defendants offered but were not allowed to 
introduce evidence that another expenditure of $14,300 was 
made in 1939 to replant the land with trees and grape vines. 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, entered judgment 
quieting plaintiff's title and denying the relief sought in 
defendants' cross-complaint. Defendants appeal. 
[1a] Defendants contend that the land was community 
property to the extent that plaintiff's efforts increased its 
value and funds used to improve it are attributable to his 
efforts and that half of such community property therefore 
passed to Mrs. La Rosa under the will. The trial court rejected 
this contention on the authority of Estate of Pepper, 158 Cal. 
619,623-624 [112 P. 62, 31 L.R.A. N.S. 1092]. 
[2] In Estate of Neilson, 57 Ca1.2d 733, 741 [22 Cal. 
Rptr. 1, 371 P.2d 745], we overruled the Pepper case and held 
that the part of the profits of a separate property enterprise 
attributable to the husband's efforts is community property, 
whether the enterprise be classified as "commercial" or "agri-
cultural." [1 b] The funds in plaintiff's bank account 
were derived primarily from profits of the enterprise. These 
funds, which were used to pay for the improvements in 1928 
and 1939, must therefore be apportioned between plaintiff's 
separate property and the community property. Any increase 
in the value of the land attributable to plaintiff's efforts was 
also community property. (Estate of Neilson, supra, 57 Ca1.2d 
at pp. 740-741.) 
[3] Defendants also contend that the trial court erred 
in ruling that they could not introduce into evidence plaintiff's 
deposition and certain answers he gave to interrogatories 
except to impeach his testimony. Code of Civil Procedure 
section 2030, subdivision (b), provides that answers to inter-
rogatorie!J "may be used to the same extent as provided in 
subdivision (d) of Section 2016 of this code for the use of 
the deposition of a party." Section 2016, subdivision (d), 
paragraph (2), provides that, "so far as admissible under the 
rules of evidence," any part or all of the deposition of a party 
"may be used by an adverse party for any purpose." Thus, 
insofar as plaintiff's deposition and answers to interrogatories 
contained admissions, they should have been admitted in evi-
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dence. (Dini v. Dini, 188 Cal.App.2d 506, 512 [10 Cal.Rptr. 
570] i Murry v. Manley, 170 Cal.App.2d 364, 367 [338 P.2d 
976].) [4] As stated in the two cited cases, an adverse 
party's deposition" may be used to establish any material fact, 
a prima facie case, or even to prove the whole case." Conse-
quently, a party is not limited to using an adverse party's 
depositiou or answers to interrogatories for the purpose of 
impeaching his testimony. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gihson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Tobriner, J., concurred. 
